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THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF
INTERMITTENT EXISTENCE AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF RESURRECTION
David B. Hershenov

Peter van Inwagen claims that if God were to reassemble the scattered
atoms of a destroyed human being, the resulting organism would not be the
individual that had died, but a duplicate. This view is challenged and an
argument is offered that resurrection after a period of nonexistence is not a
metaphysically impossible state of affairs. Also provided is an explanation
of why our fundamental mereological and biological principles are not violated if the resurrected acquire a physically fit body despite possessing a
frail form before their death. These same principles are compatible with a
solution to the worrisome problem that many of a dying human being's
molecules once were (or will be) in someone else at the time of the latter's
death. The proper account of part replacement would permit both individuals to eventually be resurrected and to coexist for eternity.

If one does not possess an immaterial and immortal soul, then the prospect
of conscious experience after death would appear to depend upon the
metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of one's biological life. By "resurrection," I don't mean just the possibility that a dead but still existing
and well preserved individual could be brought back to life. My contention
is that the human organism can even cease to exist, perhaps as a result of
cremation or extensive decay, and yet still can be brought back into existence at a later time. That is, the same organism can live again after a period of nonexistence. However, a number of philosophers, religious and secular, insist that once an individual ceases to exist he does so forever,
regardless of whether God or a future technology reassembles his atoms.
Their claim is that the resulting human being would be a duplicate, for
intermittent existence is impossible - at least for living creatures. In the
pages that follow, I aim to establish, not that the dead will be resurrected,
but that some of the alleged barriers to such an event are dubious. My contention is that resurrection after a period of nonexistence is not a metaphysically impossible state of affairs.
The purpose of the first and longest section of this paper is to challenge
Peter van Inwagen's claim that were God to reassemble the scattered
atoms of a destroyed individual, the resulting living being would not be
the human being that had died but a duplicate of him. However, I do agree
with van Inwagen that it would be metaphysically impossible for each of
us to be resurrected as we were at the age of twenty if we die as senior citiFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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All rights reserved
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zens, say as infirm eighty year olds. But I do not believe that we are condemned forever to that frail form with which we must be resurrected. The
second part of this paper aims to provide a plausible explanation of how it
is possible for us to experience a resurrection and healthy afterlife without
violating any of our fundamental mereological and biological convictions.
This includes a response to the worrisome possibility that many of our
molecules once were (or will be) in someone else at the time of the latter's
death. But even if the parts we each shared with another were vital or
numerous, this does not rule out the resurrection of either of us - although
it does prevent our simultaneous resurrection. Nevertheless, the proper
account of part replacement would permit us both to eventually be resurrected and to coexist for eternity.

Part I
Van Inwagen doubts that resurrection can occur where the dead human
being has not been preserved in a condition nearly identical to that in which
it took its last breath. Even God cannot reassemble the molecules of a cremated individual in a manner that will make the miraculously assembled person
one and the same as the individual cremated. Van Inwagen, of course,
acknowledges that it is within God's power to reassemble all the atoms of
someone destroyed through cremation, explosion or ordinary graveyard
decay. But he insists that the resulting being would be someone else - a
duplicate of the man who died and not the dead person restored to life.
Van Inwagen's religious beliefs and his materialism lead him to suggest
that at the moment we die, God replaces the newly dead form with a simulacrum and stores the preserved body somewhere for the resurrection. Since
van Inwagen's account has God involved in 'body snatching," family members actually bury or cremate illusions of loved ones and cannibals make virtual rather than real meals out of explorers, missionaries and anthropologists. This seems so bizarre that even the staunchest materialist, if he has any
religious leanings, may be tempted to give dualism another hearing.
Why is God unable to resurrect a destroyed being whose parts have
been scattered? Van Inwagen's reasoning is that God's gathering of scattered human particles would mean that a miraculous force rather than the
essential life processes of the organism are responsible for the location and
organization of the constituent matter of the life. Van Inwagen insists that
an organism at one time is identical to an organism at another time if there
is the proper biological continuity linking the two. The organism's parts
must be caught up in the same life processes and these life processes must
be responsible for the role and position of the parts. Since such processes
are absent from miraculous reassembly, this makes God's deed a duplication rather than a resurrection of the original life.
Van Inwagen illustrates his claim with the analogy of an artwork. God
can no more restore the cremated human being to life than he can restore an
artist's sculpture that was melted or beaten down into a lump. The artwork's
identity depends upon its causal origins - the intentions and the actions of
the sculptor that give each piece of clay its shape and position. The artist's
handiwork individuates the artwork, makes it the artwork it is and numeri-
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cally distinguishes it from other qualitatively identical artworks. What matters is not just that the parts of the original artwork are where they were once
before, but how they got there. According to van Inwagen, whether it be a
freak storm, another man, or even God who destroys the sculpture and then
reassembles each molecule of clay to where it was before, the original artist
would be wrong to see this as his original sculpture. He is not responsible for
this new creation. It is not his artwork, for its matter is not positioned by his
hand. And likewise, van Inwagen concludes, even God cannot reassemble
numerically the same human being. Just at the artwork needed to have its
arrangement of parts caused by the artist, a living human being needs the
arrangement of his particles to be caused by biological forces.
If the reader's initial reactions were like my own, she will find van
Inwagen's account of the persistence conditions of artworks rather convincing. Nevertheless, it is worth taking a closer look and questioning whether
van Inwagen did not rather tendentiously choose his examples from the
world of artifacts. Not all artifacts appear to have persistence conditions
that rule out" gappy" or intermittent existence, as appears to be the case with
the before-mentioned sculpture. Some artifacts could not only have been
put together by others, but "folk ontology" (metaphysical commonsense)
suggests that they can be disassembled and reassembled. In fact, this category of artifacts which can be assembled, disassembled and reassembled
even includes some artworks. Many modem art constructions and displays
involve a number of pieces which can be packed up, carted off to another
museum and reassembled without being the creation of a new artwork.
Such artworks might be understood as either not existing when disassembled and thus capable of intermittent existence, or as continuing to exist
throughout the interim period - though as a scattered object.
Leaving artworks aside for the moment, consider a gun that can be disassembled and put in a carrying case. This is not a new gun that comes into
existence when it is reassembled. If new guns could so appear, a hired
killer standing on trial could protest to the judge that the gun the prosecution has introduced as evidence could not possibly be the murder weapon
because it had not even been in existence at the time of the killing, since the
police have recently taken its parts out of the briefcase in which it was discovered and assembled them for display in court.
Consider also that paradigmatic scattered object - the watch under
repair. Its numerous pieces can be spread out on a repairman's table. Many
laymen and philosophers believe the watch continues to exist in such a
scattered form. It should not be thought that it is because disassembled and
reassembled watches and guns are taken apart and put back together in
ways predetermined by the manufacturer that their restoration is successful, while the reassembly of a cremated being is the creation of a duplicate
rather than the resurrection of the original. My intuition is that the assassin
intending to conceal his gun in a briefcase can cut up and store the gun in
ways the manufacturers did not design it to be disassembled. Likewise, the
repairman does not have to separate the watch at its joints but can break
off parts that were not the size and shape of the components originally
assembled. He can break apart the watch any way he pleases so long as he
can still reassemble the object.
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Nor do I think that there is a limit on the size to which the parts can be
reduced and still be considered parts. Admittedly, there is a difference
between the atoms that compose the gun and large parts such as the barrel and trigger. The atoms aren't noticeable gun parts. They could just as
well each be a part of something other than a gun, unlike the barrel and
trigger. Still, if a laser can manipulate a single atom component of a gun
(and we can imagine that such a procedure is necessary to repair a precision atomic gun of the future), there is no reason not to consider the atom
a part of the watch. Furthermore, the atom is a part of the object according
to standard mereological definitions. And I don't see any reason for
believing that something can be reassembled only when it has been
reduced to large parts rather than atomic parts. Many viewers of Star Trek
don't find it counterintuitive to imagine that a gun can be broken down
into its elementary particles and beamed to another location and then
reassembled. But if the beam malfunctions, scattering the atoms across the
galaxy, and then, just by chance, the same atoms coalesced in the shape of
the gun years later, it won't be the same gun, or a gun at all. An artifact
has relational properties essentially. An object must be intentionally made
in order to be an artifact. But if the parts, no matter how small and scattered, are deliberately reassembled in accordance with the original intention of its maker, it strikes me as intuitively the same object. This intuition
can be reinforced if we compare a watch that continues to exist even
though its parts are scattered across the repairman's table to the qualitatively similar parts in the garbage can that do not compose a watch, even
a scattered one. Because of the craftsman's involvement with the parts of
the watch, we are disposed to claim the watch still exists. But there is no
involvement with nor intention to reassemble the parts in the trash.
However, if the craftsman changed his mind and the parts were retrieved
from the trash, wouldn't they compose the same watch that they did the
last time they were assembled? I would think so. The reader who says no
would be committed to the watch on the repairman'S table permanently
going out of existence if the craftsman decides not to reassemble the parts.
(Perhaps there is no market for such watches any longer.) But if the craftsman changes his mind (perhaps due to another shift in the market) and
decides to assemble the parts on his repair table, it seems farfetched to
claim that they would compose a new watch.
It is worthwhile to reflect upon the originating causes of artifacts in
order to determine which are essential to individuating objects. My contention is that while a manufactured object must be the result of someone's
intention to be an artifact, and (most of) its original matter is essential to it,
other causal facts and processes responsible for the arrangement of its original material are not. If it is not important where the material was or how it
came together when an artifact first came into existence, perhaps it should
not be thought relevant to the identity of any object what events preceded
the assembling of its parts for a second time. That is, if possible variations in
the causal origins of an object would not affect the identity of the first
assembled object, why not consider the second assembly of the numerically identical parts to be a rebuilding of the original artifact rather than the
creation of a duplicate? By analogy, why not consider the reassembled
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remains of the cremated human organism to be the resurrection of the original individual rather than the creation of a duplicate?
It would no doubt be helpful to provide a concrete illustration of the
thesis of the last passage. Consider your purchase of a prefabricated toolshed that has never been assembled. Does it matter if your delivery and
assembly person is Smith rather than Jones? That is, if Smith assembles the
purchase is it a different tool shed than if Jones had been the first to assemble it? It does not seem plausible that the identity of the assembler determines which tool shed you bought and own. Moreover, can't you have
Smith assemble your toolshed on the showroom floor and then have Jones
disassemble it, pack it up and then reassemble it in your back yard without
affecting the identity of your purchase? I would think so. Now consider the
machine gun that you bought to protect your new toolshed from graffitiwriting vandals. Each part of it was manufactured separately by an assembly line machine. Does it matter if machine A rather than machine B assembled the gun? That is, would it be a different gun if a different machine had
assembled the very same parts? My intuition is that it would be the very
same gun. Ask yourself whether you have created a new gLffi that needs to
be licensed every time you take the gun out of its carrying case, screw its
barrel, handle, trigger, and telescopic sight together in order to shoot a
young vandal with a can of spray paint. If you answer yes, your metaphysics seem to me to be as dubious as your morals.
Thus van Inwagen's reliance upon our intuitions about artifact identity
in order to reinforce his claim about the impossibility of our existing again
after our biological components lose their structure and proximity to each
other, appears less compelling after we have observed that some artifacts
can survive as scattered objects when disassembled or can even exist intermittently. Which type of artifact, if any, are human beings more like? Are
we more similar to the sculptured artworks or the mass produced and variously assembled artifacts? Perhaps the correct answer is that we are quite
unlike both. Despite some misgivings about the entire enterprise of comparing artworks and human animals, I want to push the artifact/ artwork/ animal analogy a little further. Consider human sexual reproduction. It does
not involve anything like the artist leaving his intentional mark on the product. There are millions of sperm heading for an egg and the parents do not
intend which sperm meets the egg or what combination of genes are
formed by fertilization. So no artist-like intention is the source of the
arrangement of the zygote's essential matter. Absent from a human being's
origin is an artistic concern with the details of creation and the location of
the incipient human being's parts which characterized the statue. Whether
the same sperm meets the same egg earlier or later, or which technician carries out the in vitro fertilization of that egg, should not affect our identity.
This perhaps makes our origins more like those of artifacts that can be
assembled by anyone at different times without this affecting their identity.
But even if it is thought that the proper analogy is between the human
being and the sculpture, rather than the human being and the toolshed or
the gun, I do not think this will support van Inwagen's thesis. Consider a
sculpture made in a studio of a master sculptor. The apprentice of the master places each piece of clay in a position at the direction of the master.
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Who is the art work's creator? I tend to think that it is just the master
unless the apprentice is doing something highly skilled. Even in the latter
case, my judgement would be that the sculpture is a co-creation rather than
the artistic creation solely of the apprentice. If the master can create or cocreate an artwork that another assembles, why can he not be rightly considered the creator or co-creator of a statue that results from others reassembling the clay of his now destroyed statue, if they do so in accordance with
the intentions that he originally conveyed to his apprentice? Perhaps we
should see the product of the second assembly as numerically identical to
the first one completed by the dutiful apprentice. Thus such a sculpture
could have a gappy" or scattered existence.
Why not view God's behavior as analogous to the directions the master sculptor gave to the apprentice? God could be understood as the
"original artist" who created the world and arranged its matter and laws
so that there would be organisms. Such background assumptions would
make it plausible to think that God could resurrect people if He were
faithful to His original blueprint that formed and maintained the human
beings in question. So just as there are not any metaphysical principles
that rule out the restoration of a destroyed statue, it appears that none
render our resurrection impossible.
However, even if the claims above were to lead van Inwagen to admit
that his account of artifacts is flawed, he could insist that this just means
that artifacts are not like human beings in the relevant ways and thus are
not useful for making any identity claims about the latter. He might maintain that his position is not at odds with the story I told about the details
and the causes of our origins. He can grant the essentiality of the original
matter and the irrelevance of much of the causal history that culminated
with our origins. He can then admit that the "when," "where," and "how"
our matter first came together is metaphysically irrelevant. Van Inwagen
might insist that whether we came into existence through a sexual act, an
advanced biotech procedure, or whether God just miraculously merged the
matter that would otherwise have been so arranged by a natural process of
fertilization and zygote formation, is all moot, for the only position he is
committed to is that of the metaphysical importance of our continuity as
human organisms. His central claim is that an individual's constitutive matter must remain caught up in a life without interruption and when the various particles are eventually replaced it is by ongoing biological processes
characteristic of every organism. Both the self-maintained structural integrity of the organism and the addition of new matter must be due to biological
processes involving the metabolizing of food, the assimilation of oxygen,
the excretion of wastes, the maintenance of homeostasis etc. So what matters to identity is that a human being's parts are where they are due to the
continual biological processes of the organism rather than some other cause
such as God's miraculous tracking and reassembling of matter that has long
ceased to be caught up in any life processes.
My contention is that the issue of what manner of resurrection is metaphysically possible is not unrelated to the possibility that we could have
originated in a different manner than we actually did. I have been insisting
that it is not important how our parts come together in their first assembly
II
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at the time of our origins, in order to downplay the significance of any
events preceding a later assembly to object identity. If it does not matter
whether we are initially a result of a miracle, in vitro fertilization or sexual
reproduction, why should it matter when the parts are reassembled a second time? I am emphasizing that what is essential is that certain matter be
caught up in a life, rather than how it got there or even whether the life
continued uninterrupted.
To weaken the hold that van Inwagen's biological continuity intuition
might have on you, consider for the sake of argument that someone came
into existence through fertilization in a petri dish at an infertility clinic at
T1. Surely this individual could have come into existence later at T2 if the
union of the same sperm and egg had been delayed a little while. So the
same organism that might have originated at T1 in World 1 has now come
into existence at T2 in W2' Now imagine in W3 that the same being is
destroyed an instant after it originates as a zygote and before it had physically changed at all. The destroyed parts of the zygote are then reassembled at T2 in W 3 and are physically identical to the parts of the organism
that they would have composed if that organism had first come into existence at T2 in W 2' There is absolutely no quantitative or qualitative physical difference between the parts of the one celled organism in the different
worlds. Can it really matter that the organism at T2 in W3 is not the result
of a continuous biological processes from TI? If it does not seem to matter
that the organism in WI or W 2 or W3 comes into existence initially from a
test tube or normal conception or a miraculous fusion of the matter essential to the zygote at either T1 or T2, can it really matter metaphysically if in
W3 the zygote at T2 consists of the reassembled parts of the zygote at T1
rather than possesses those same parts due to biological continuity? There
are no physical differences in the zygotes separated by the temporal gaps.
The zygote in W 3 at T2 is physically identical to how it would have been if
it had originated then rather than been reassembled at that time.
It should not be thought that the identity claims in the above passage
are only plausible because the entity discussed is a one cell organism of the
type that we all originate from. A similar point could be made with a complex organism rather than a zygote. God could have brought you into existence just a split second ago complete with "quasi - memories" of having
lived for decades. God also could have had you originate two days from
now. Consider the possibility that God destroys you a moment after creating you and then two days later, at the exact time that God could have
originally brought you into existence, He reassembles your parts exactly as
they were at the time he destroyed you. I find it difficult to believe that this
is a duplicate rather than you, especially when we have already established
you could have been brought into existence in that condition and at that
moment for the first time. Can it really matter if at that later time the
assembled entity is not biologically continuous with you from your origin?
There would have been no physical change between the two beings
because you were destroyed an instant after being created.
I have probably pushed the readers as far as they will go on the previous issue. So let us tum now to a second argument that van Inwagen offers
to show that the manner in which an individual's parts are united in the
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future determines whether that individual continues to exist or if a duplicate has replaced him. Van Inwagen maintains that the reassembly of the
matter that once composed an individual is not sufficient for his resurrection. To show this, van Inwagen makes use of a thought experiment in
which all the matter that composed him when he was ten years old is
reassembled across the room from him. Which individual is van Inwagen?
It seems obvious that van Inwagen would not be the youthful-looking person who just appeared, even though, years ago, van Inwagen was composed of the numerically same atoms. But van Inwagen insists that those
who claim resurrection just involves the reassembly of an individual's
atoms, have no grounds upon which to reject the claim of the youngster
that he is Peter van Inwagen.
Van Inwagen overlooks alternative explanations available to the believers in the reassembly model of resurrection. One reason that many people
might not think that Peter van Inwagen would be the individual with the
childish appearance is that van Inwagen already exists. Already existing,
his identity cannot be threatened by what happens elsewhere. But this
response could not be made to another thought experiment that van
Inwagen puts forth in a later article. Van Inwagen imagines that a thousand years from now, God could reassemble the atoms that composed him
when he was twenty and could also reassemble the atoms that composed
him at his death decades later, say when he was eighty. Van lnwagen asks:
And which will be I? Neither or both, it would seem, and, since not both,
neither." But van Inwagen's thought experiments do not support the conclusion that resurrection through reassembly is impossible. Most of us who
believe that we can cease to exist and then reappear, insist that the
reassembly must be of the parts we had at the time of our destruction. To
come back as a robust twenty year old when one died as a frail eighty year
old is to deny sixty years of one's existence. One's life had continued
throughout those years. That is why in either of the two thought experiments, the presence of the individual with the youthful appearance does
not make it difficult for us to identify van Inwagen. Even though the being
with the youthful appearance is composed of the original atoms that constituted the older man years earlier, he is not identical to the latter.
The reader should not think that this principle that one can exist again
only if one returns as one last existed is ad hoc. The same principle governs
the intermittent existence of other entities. A baseball game suspended in
the sixth inning due to rain or darkness cannot resume the next day in the
second inning. But just as the game can resume in the sixth inning, my
intuition is that a person who died when he was eighty could exist again if
the parts he had at the last time of his existence were reassembled. The
same point holds in other cases of intermittent existence such as trials,
classes, and theatrical plays. A trial can be suspended but it must resume
where it left off or it would be a new trial. For instance, if all the previous
oaths, testimony, motions, evidence, depositions etc. were not considered
part of the trial when the court was next in order, it won't be the same trial.
A similar point can be made of a class that is suspended due to a school
shooting, teachers' strike or natural disaster. The same class can resume
only if the assignments and tests previously completed are counted
II
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towards the class's requirements. If they were not, we wouldn't describe
the class as being numerically the same as the one interrupted. Readers
who would identify the classes even if the earlier work was not accepted
may be guilty of a type-token fallacy.
An analogy with artifacts can again be used to weaken van Inwagen's
claims. Even if all of a car's parts that had been replaced over a period of
twenty years were of sufficient number to compose a car when they were
reassembled, one would not think that the latter would be the same car
that had left the factory assembly line twenty years earlier. And this is true
even if the twenty year old car was disassembled and undergoing repairs
in a service garage at the time that its discarded parts from the previous
twenty years were reassembled. (Like the gun and the toolshed mentioned
earlier, the car can be disassembled and reassembled.) So there is plenty of
evidence that it is an entity's most recent parts and their position relative to
each other that matter to its continued existence. These parts need not be
immanent causes of the entity at a later stage, for the entity can be disassembled and reassembled. Nevertheless, the parts an entity had at its most
recent moment of existence are necessary for it to exist later, just as the
parts that an entity had at its actual origin, would, of necessity, have to be
its constituent matter if that entity were to have come into existence at a
different time.
If God reassembles a cremated individual, the parts of the resulting
individual are not where they are merely because of biological processes.
But that doesn't mean the individual's atoms are where they are solely
because of God's miracle. God has miraculously placed them where they
are in relation to each other because of the relative position the biological
processes last bestowed upon them. The biological processes thus have a
causal role, it is just not one of immanent causation. If God chooses to resurrect an organism, that last material arrangement of the biological
processes determines the location of the divinely reassembled parts.

Part II
Whether the reader agrees with what I have said so far, or accepts van
Inwagen's "Body Snatching" account, she still probably wants to know
why it is that someone is not stuck after resurrection with the frail eighty
year old form she had at her death? And what keeps her from immediately
dying again of the same disease or injury? Undoubtably, God could
remove the lethal threat in the blink of an eye, but wouldn't she still be frail
and old? I can't make another appeal to God's power to instantaneously
restore a woman to her youth since I claimed earlier that God could not
bring any of us back into existence as robust twenty year olds if we die at
eighty. My response is to begin with noting the obvious: that we can delay
aging without feeling we are violating any metaphysical truths. No one
thinks that when people take vitamins containing antioxidants they have
done something to threaten their identity and survival. Since some people
age more slowly than others, could the aging process of the latter naturally
speed up or the former slow down? I do not see why not and since at all
ages we are replacing old cells with new ones, why could not the new skin
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cells of an eighty year old resemble those that replaced the earlier dead
cells when she was in her twenties? It is not much of a step from admitting
this is metaphysically legitimate to allowing the reversal of the aging
process. As long as restoration of a youthful form does not happen too
quickly and the replacement parts are not too large, the result should be
metaphysically and biologically acceptable.
But why, the reader might ask, does the speed or size of the part
replacement matter? The key lies in the concept of "assimilation."
Assimilation has to do with how an entity integrates new parts with its old.
Not any kind of part replacement will preserve the existence of the entity
in question. Our attitude about part replacement is determined by what is
the norm for the type of entity in question. That our familiarity with this
norm makes us doubt that a person could survive any process that
diverges greatly in speed or size of part replacement is no reason for suspicion if such an attitude reflects biological fact about what it is to be a part of
an organism. Consider the replacement of a human being's parts. Human
organisms naturally replace all of their matter slowly over a period of time.
If we imagine thought experiments where our parts are changed in different sizes and at different speeds, our intuitions about our survival are correlated with how closely the thought experiments parallel normal, natural
biological replacement. If a person's parts are replaced in two steps, first by
an exact duplicate of his entire left side from his brain to his toes, and then
by an exact duplicate of his right side, our attitude would be that he did
not survive but had been replaced by a duplicate, who thought he was the
original person in question. So size matters.
Speed also matters. If I were informed that all my parts were shortly to
be replaced in succession in a process taking only a matter of seconds, I
would believe that a duplicate would soon take my place. I believe that it is
the lack of assimilation that precludes surviving speedy part replacement.
The importance of assimilation can be seen in cases in which it is lacking.
Consider replacing the parts of a child that has been cryogenically frozen.
Could the child survive all of its parts being replaced in a split second? I
doubt it. Because the low temperatures have suspended all life processes,
the portions of new matter are never caught up in the child's physiology.
The result is that the original child has been replaced by a duplicate. That
one could not survive speedy part replacement because of the lack of
assimilation is even more evident if we imagine a person being teletransportated. Most people, though not van Inwagen, probably believe they
could survive teletransportation from Earth to Mars if their original Earth
atoms were reassembled on Mars. But we are less likely to believe that we
would survive if all of our deconstructed parts were, while on route to
Mars, removed one by one from the teletransportation beam and replaced
sequentially with small, qualitatively identical but numerically distinct
parts, and these new parts were reassembled on Mars when the beam
arrived there. This lack of survival is even clearer if the being that ends up
materializing on the teletransportation platform on Mars has a qualitatively very different brain, body and psychology from that of the person
whose parts were the original ones in the beam. But the same qualitative
changes in body, brain and personality that result from part replacement
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wouldn't threaten the reader's identity if they were to occur slowly outside
the beam in the normal course of life. Such changes would roughly parallel
the ordinary physiological and psychological growth and changes of any
person from youth to old age.
Why do we have this intuition that we could not survive even qualitatively identical part replacement in the teletransportation beam, but could
survive even greater qualitative and quantitative changes outside of the
beam over a longer period? The answer is that the new parts inserted into
the beam containing us in scattered form were not assimilated into our
body, gradually becoming caught up in the same life functions and psychology. Standardly, the new parts of one's body and mind only become
parts of the old body and mind when they become involved and integrated
into the same biology and psychology. A JJforeign body" is something that
does not become caught up in the life process of an organism. No potential
body part can be biologically assimilated by a body while the latter is scattered in a teletransportation beam.
The last problem I want to consider is whether resurrection is possible if
one's parts were posthumously assimilated into another human being. The
concern motivating this is that if some of one's parts at the time of one's
death were later assimilated into another human organism, remaining
there until death, then both can be resurrected with the same parts only as
Siamese Twins, sharing perhaps a limb that we had both possessed.
Coming back as Siamese twins, seems more in line with a spoof of this
debate rather than a solution to it.
We clearly do not need all of our original parts. We can lose legs, add
prosthetics and still exist. Of course, God does not have to resurrect us with
prosthetics - He can make new limbs for us. But a problem occurs if too
much of one's vital matter becomes part of the vital matter of another person. Both of us could not survive without that particular chunk of matter, so
substituting two new chunks of matter for it, as was done in the case of the
shared limb, would result not in our resurrections but in our duplications.
However, we do not have to fall back on van Inwagen's body-snatching
simulacra-making divinity to avoid this. The answer is just that we cannot
all be resurrected at the same time. However, God could speed up our part
replacement to the maximum point where any faster matter exchange
would result in duplication rather than resurrection with newly assimilated
matter. So after the one first resurrected assimilates new matter and releases
the old, the "old matter" could be used in the resurrection of the other
being. We eventually could both coexist, and could do so for eternity. This
staggered version of resurrection surely seems a preferable solution to having God leave us believing we are burying what is really but an illusion.

Conclusion
So it appears that the changes of matter necessary for a healthy resurrection are not of a size or speed that would cause us to doubt whether the living being is the same individual who existed before at death's door. The
fact that the individual's life would involve gaps may be no more problematic than the disassembly and reassembly, or even the destruction and
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restoration, of artifacts and artworks. Since the artist can create or co-create
a work of art by giving instructions to others who use their own hands to
arrange the matter of the artist's creation, there doesn't seem to be any
good reason for rejecting the claim that the reassembly of such an object's
parts, when done in accordance with the original artist's intentions, brings
about the existence again of the original artwork. So van Inwagen's analogy to our own destruction and resurrection cannot receive any support
from the realm of artworks and artifacts. And if we are God's creations, the
result of biological processes that He put in motion, then we too should be
able to exist again when our parts are reassembled in very much the same
manner that they were at the time of our destruction. And we have seen
that this position can be reinforced by the possibility that we could have
corne into existence with the very same matter at different times. This
makes it plausible to maintain that we could have been destroyed a
moment after our actual origins and then brought back into existence with
the very same matter and at the very same time that it was possible for us
to first have originated. And such an event could be accurately described
as a type of resurrection.
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soulless material beings. I am not denying that there exist immaterial beings
(e.g. God, Angels), I just doubt that we belong to this category. Unfortunately,
to defend the claim that we lack immaterial souls would result in too much of a
digression. All that I can say here is that what we know about the neurological
dependence of thought provides us with reason to doubt that we possess an
immaterial mind/soul. For an elaboration see Peter van Inwagen's Metaphysics
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) pp. 178-180 and also Paul Churchland's
Consciousness and Matter. (Cambridge: Bradford Books, 1990) pp. 18-21.
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they do occupy largely because of the processes that used to go on within me:
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the processes of life have been "started up again" may well be the very man
who was once before alive, provided the processes of dissolution did not
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progress too far while he was a corpse. But if a man does not simply die but is
totally destroyed (as in the case of cremation) then he can never be reconstituted, for the causal chain has been irrevocably broken. Thus if God collects the
atoms that used to constitute the man and 'reassembles' them, they will occupy
the positions relative to one another because of God's miracle and not because
of the operation of the natural processes that, taken collectively, were the life of
the man." "The Possibility of Resurrection." International Journal of Philosophy of
Religion~ Vol. IX No.2 1978. pp. 119.
5. Van Inwagen's actual examples are of an ancient manuscript penned by
St. Augustine that is burned and the parts miraculously reassembled by God
and a modem child's house of blocks construction that is knocked down and
then reassembled by the parent. Since I am interested in the resurrection of a
human being it is useful to contrast this with the reassembly of a statue of a
human being. Furthermore, the statue example in a sense combines traits of
both of van Inwagen's examples of a famous creation made by the hand of a
historical figure and the "lumpy" construction as involved in the blocks. I
don't think any harm is done by the switch.
6. Bill Forgie has pointed out to me that matters are complicated if the
parts are scattered and used in other artifacts. Can they ever be reassembled
into the earlier artifacts that they were part of? I will address this near the end
of the paper, since we are really interested in the resurrection of human beings.
7. William Hasker's questions provoked the discussion in this passage.
8. See Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1972) pp. 113-116.
9. It may be thought that genetic engineering of children in the future will
make their creation more like that of an artwork for particular genes will be
placed in specific chromosomal areas just as particular pieces of clay are placed
by the sculptor in specific locations.
10. Or consider a print. Isn't the creator the artist and not the person who
runs off the prints?
11. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer who urged me to take up this
second argument of van Inwagen's.
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15. This stress on the last material arrangement frees my account from the
critique that defenders of immanent causation direct against those who think
that identity over time just amounts to spatial-temporal continuity. This leaves
them without grounds to deny the identity of a being that is destroyed with
the duplicate that replaces it if this all occurs without any spatio-temporal gap.
For discussion and references see Dean Zimmerman's "Immanent Causation."
Philosophical Perspectives. 11,1997. p. 435.
16. By "reversal" I do not mean regression to infancy.
17. See Peter Unger's Consciousness, Identity and Value. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990.) pp. 147-156 for an informative account of part replacement and assimilation. I am quite indebted to Unger on this matter.
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